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Dueling Stakeholders and Dual-Hatted Systems Engineers:  
Engineering Challenges, Capabilities and Skills in  
Government Infrastructure Technology Projects 
ABSTRACT 
Systems engineering projects that support government enterprises face substantial 
challenges due to demands from diverse stakeholders and rapidly-changing 
technologies. In this paper, we present findings from the analysis of five case studies of 
systems engineering projects for large government enterprises. We focus on what can be 
learned from systems engineers, their essential role, and their engineering practices. As 
they work to establish interoperability across pre-existing and new technologies while 
creating an evolving infrastructure, the engineers commonly face ―agonistic‖ tensions 
between groups of stakeholders. Temporal pacing conflicts are especially prevalent, such 
as those between some stakeholder groups concerned with fast-paced streams of 
innovation and others concerned with current operations. In response, many engineers are 
following an evolutionary approach, developing new capabilities for incremental 
modularization and re/integration of technologies and associated practices across 
organizational (stakeholder) boundaries. Additionally, engineers are leveraging their 
professional role and developing new skills of influence to support these capabilities for 
addressing stakeholder tensions. We close by discussing implications of our findings for 
the management of infrastructure technology projects, for organizational design and 
engineering of government enterprises, and for the changing role of systems engineers. 
  
INTRODUCTION 
Systems engineering projects are becoming increasingly complex as government 
organizations use information technology to coordinate and consolidate the efforts of multiple 
agencies into enterprises that share information and provide services.  Rather than developing a 
single stove-piped system for a hierarchically-organized customer, as in traditional systems 
engineering, these enterprise systems engineering projects confront multiple information and 
communication systems and technologies—many already in operational use— that must 
somehow be linked into a coherent infrastructure [15] for diverse and competing stakeholder 
communities.  For example, the military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, etc.) are now being 
mandated to use interoperable communications and information technologies in an ongoing 
transition toward ―net-centric operations;‖ similar pressures exist for national agencies including 
Health and Human Services, Homeland Security and Federal Aviation Administration.  Further, 
in contrast to for-profit enterprises, government enterprises often lack both an overall 
hierarchical management chain and a bottom-line mechanism for evaluating success – a 
combination that renders their systems engineering projects all the more challenging.   
This paper reports results from a research study on social and organizational aspects of 
large-scale systems engineering projects in five government enterprises.  These case studies 
revealed that systems engineers are adapting both their capabilities for managing projects and 
their individual professional skill sets to meet the challenges inherent in this shift from systems 
to infrastructure.  Our evidence suggests new implications for the management of infrastructure 
technology projects, for the organizational design and engineering of government enterprises, 
and for the changing role of systems engineers. 
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SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
Systems engineering began as a sub-discipline of engineering after World War II when 
the development of weapons systems, aerospace systems, and other commercial applications was 
expanding beyond the capabilities of independent engineering disciplines [22], [32], [35], [54].  
By offering the label of ―system,‖ the focus was placed on the entire technical system being 
engineered, such as a missile or airplane, rather than on the component pieces that were the 
responsibility of discipline-based sub-teams and subcontractors.  Ferris [22] notes that a 
significant portion of the systems engineering approach was an emphasis on the planning and 
control of technical work.   
Although systems engineering is still a relatively young and evolving field [60], its major 
activities have already coalesced around systems analysis, acquisition and supply, project 
management, system design (requirements and specifications) and integration, implementation or 
transition to use, and technical evaluation [35, p. 36], [41].  These traditional systems 
engineering methods for achieving interoperability and avoiding redundancies are predicated on 
long development cycles and emphasize formally structured requirements, specifications, and 
integration testing at the end of the project.   
The concept of ―system-of-systems engineering‖ (SoSE) [20], [36] emerged in the late 
1980s to address a recognized need for an engineering approach that focused on the integration 
of multiple, complex systems [27].
1
  Building on the systems engineering efforts for individual 
systems, SoSE emphasizes the ―interaction‖ and ―synergy‖ between independent systems toward 
overall system performance [34].  Yet, despite a number of efforts to codify the principles and 
                                                 
1
  Gorod and Sauser [27] provide a thorough and detailed history of the evolution of the SoSE field. 
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practices of the discipline, SoSE has neither a coherent, widely accepted definition [52] nor 
agreement on whether or not the concept is even needed (cf. [10]). 
Traditional systems engineering approaches and even SoSE approaches are still not   
sufficient to address some types of problems for large government enterprises [37], [47].  Hughes 
[32, p. 304] noted that systems engineering was continuing to evolve as more large-scale systems 
are developed in military and civilian applications, and is increasingly ―a messily complex 
embracing of contradictions‖ with the projects being ―socially constructed, not technologically 
and economically determined‖ (see also [60]).  Further, Rouse [51] suggests that the emphasis 
for systems development has recently shifted from platforms to capabilities.    
An emerging concept has come to be known as Enterprise Systems Engineering (ESE). 
Rhodes, Ross, and Nightingale [48] observe that the enterprise systems concept is ―well 
accepted,‖ yet the research literature remains limited and ―insufficient for many contemporary 
enterprises that are (or are evolving into) large-scale, global systems integrators or solution 
providers‖ (p.2).  Enterprise systems often span multiple organizations, require a higher degree 
of integration, and must support varied and complex interactions among processes, technology, 
and people, without recourse to a hierarchical control authority [11].  However, in large 
enterprises with different systems and technologies evolving at different rates, component 
technologies must now be (continuously) integrated across different lifecycle stages so that 
traditional systems engineering approaches predicated on large sets of formally-structured 
requirements and long development cycles are no longer practical.    
In this paper we present the results of an exploratory study of five large government-
contracted enterprise systems engineering projects that vary in size, duration, complexity, and 
success.  Our study examines the engineering challenges and the engineers‘ adaptive responses 
with the intent of capturing emerging enterprise systems engineering knowledge and approaches 
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that can be useful for understanding and improving the management of such engineering 
projects.   Our primary research question was to understand and describe ―enterprise systems 
engineering‖ – how it was different from traditional systems engineering.  A secondary question 
was how experienced systems engineers were addressing these differences in their work.   
METHODS 
Because theory on our research questions was nascent and there was little a priori 
specification of constructs, empirical field research was needed to develop theory, with special 
attention to issues of validity [60].  We used a qualitative research approach: comparative case 
studies for theory development [18], [62].   Our research team included three senior engineer 
practitioners and several social scientists.
2
  This diversity of researchers‘ backgrounds helped to 
limit bias [19, p. 28] during data collection and analysis, and ensured that we had adequate 
expertise to understand both technical and organizational contingencies relevant to systems 
engineering work.  
Case Selection 
We had access to cases contracted between government enterprises and the MITRE 
Corporation, a not-for-profit organization that administers several Federally-Funded Research 
and Development Centers (FFRDCs) involved in the technical design of large information and 
communication systems for government enterprises.  FFRDCs are not-for-profit organizations 
outside of the US government that conduct research and/or do systems engineering work for 
federal government agencies; comparable organizations exist in other nations as well. 
We selected cases according to theoretical sampling to support replication logic [18], 
[62].  This enabled us to use each case as a separate field experiment in evaluating inferences 
                                                 
2
  The number of social science members on the team fluctuated between three and five over the three years of the 
project, Fall 2005 – Summer 2008. 
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drawn from the others.  We selected five cases all of which were large in size (tens of thousands 
or hundreds of thousands of users) and that spanned across a range of customer groups and levels 
of success.  The cases also varied in length of project, maturity of technologies, and national 
setting.  Case details are provided  in Table 1.  
<< insert Table 1 about here >> 
Data Collection 
We gathered data from multiple sources – interviews, observation, and documentary 
materials – to enable triangulation and increase construct validity.  Our primary source of data 
was interviews conducted by a team of researchers with different backgrounds which also 
supported confidence in our conclusions.  Interviews were typically held at the site where the 
engineering work was ongoing, which permitted observation.  Researchers also obtained other 
background information, reviewing newspaper articles, web sites, and archived project materials, 
and attended a project conference for one of the cases. 
To enable effective data collection on topics with highly technical content, the engineers 
on the research team assumed key roles in designing the interview protocol and conducting the 
interviews.  The engineer-researchers were first trained by the social scientists on appropriate 
methods for conducting objective and thorough interviews.  With the close involvement of their 
social science colleagues, the engineer-practitioner researchers composed a series of questions 
for a semi-structured interview protocol (see Appendix) designed to be similar to the types of 
conversations that engineers typically have with each other, in order to encourage candid 
sharing.   
Senior managers overseeing each project provided the names of project leads who then 
identified qualified potential interviewees for each case study.  All but two of the interviews 
were led by an engineer-researcher, with at least two researchers with social science backgrounds 
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taking notes and interjecting clarifying questions as necessary.  Interviews lasted between sixty 
and ninety minutes.  Social science researchers typed up their notes shortly after the interviews 
and the engineer-researchers helped interpret acronyms and other engineering terminology.     
Between three and six interviews were carried out for each case during the 2006-2007 
timeframe; we refer to these as ―Tier 1‖ interviews.  Some additional (―Tier 2‖) interviews were 
conducted in 2008, using questions developed after the preliminary analysis of Tier 1 data.  
Altogether, a total of 30 interviews with 27 individuals were conducted across the five cases.
3
  
Additionally, one social science researcher sat in on three interviews with engineers from a 
second government agency in the Beta case, courtesy of an independent research project 
conducted by the Defense Acquisition University; this data was especially useful in balancing 
different perspectives across agencies in that case.   
Analysis Process 
We took precautions to counteract potential investigator bias during the analysis phase.  
The data collection and case-writing phases overlapped, during which time the team held weekly 
meetings to compare data, discuss cases, iteratively refine constructs and develop emerging 
themes, incorporating the views of both social science and engineer members of the research 
team.  Each case was separately analyzed and written prior to the cross-case analysis. In addition 
to triangulating across multiple sources of data, multiple people with different backgrounds were 
involved in the writing and reviewing of each case study.   
To ensure basic consistency of format across the case studies, the team created a common 
case outline.  One or two authors then prepared a detailed case write-up for each individual 
project, first reading through all transcribed notes from the interviews on that case, and then 
                                                 
3
  Of these, one of the Tier 1 interviews involved two interviewees rather than just one; and four of the Tier 2 
interviews were with people we had previously interviewed in Tier 1.   
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performing ad hoc coding to identify key themes particular to each case.  Each case study was 
written as a detailed history, including a timeline of critical events, organizational charts, 
program accomplishments, challenges faced, engineering practices, lessons learned, and 
suggestions for further research.  Each case was then iteratively reviewed and revised –  first by 
other social science members of the team, then by a researcher-engineer, then by the 
interviewees from the project, and finally by the corporate project manager.  When engineers 
differed on their interpretations of case details, we discussed the matters and found ways to write 
the cases that they could then agree upon.  Higher-level managers had a broader view of the 
project contexts and were able to recommend additional interviews to fill in gaps in the data, as 
well as how to redact the data to eliminate unnecessary risks to the projects or to individuals.  
This combination of multiple reviews from different perspectives strengthened the validity of 
each individual case write-up.     
The team began preliminary cross-case analysis as individual case studies were being 
finalized.  Tabular matrices [42] were developed to identify themes across the cases, which were 
then presented to interviewees for review during two workshops; these were also reviewed by 
senior managers.  After all individual cases had been completed and accepted by interviewees 
and project managers, the principal investigator initiated the formal cross-case analysis, 
reviewing all of the original interview notes, the five case studies and memos on the high-level 
themes, before completing a second round of coding across the entire five case data set.  These 
results were reviewed by social science team members, engineers, and managers.  Relevant 
literature was iteratively compared with the emerging results to further refine our findings and 
was incorporated in the written products. 
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FINDINGS  
Challenges 
Our data revealed that the engineers experienced major difficulties related to instability in 
the environment and systems requirements – instability which often prevented the traditional 
systems engineering processes from reaching completion.  One Delta engineer described the 
challenge as ―many moving parts, [which] constantly move.‖  A Beta engineer reported that the 
complexity of the enterprise organization ―broke a significant number of the traditional systems 
engineering practices that we depend on.‖   
Much of the instability emerged from several distinct kinds of conflict or tension among 
stakeholders.  Two of these categories of tension are consistent with those found in the 
development of computer infrastructures [16]:  interest and exclusion and ownership/investment 
models.  However, our results extend their approach in two ways:  First, our data suggest that 
there is a significant difference in the success of the project depending upon the organizational 
design of the enterprise (see Table 2); and second, we identified a new category of agonistic 
tensions – pacing of development (see Table 3).  We elaborate on these tensions below after a 
brief summary of the relevant work on infrastructure. 
Infrastructure Evolution and Agonistic Tensions 
The historian of science and technology Paul Edwards and his associates draw a sharp 
distinction between technical systems and infrastructures in computer system development.  
They assert: ―In general, …infrastructures are not systems.  Instead, they are networks or webs 
that enable locally controlled and maintained systems to interoperate more or less seamlessly‖ 
[16, p. 12; emphasis in original].  According to this view, infrastructures develop through stages, 
beginning with the system building stage, in which ―visionary‖ designers exercise considerable 
control.  However, in the consolidation phase, separate systems and/or networks are linked 
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together – first in smaller area networks and then more globally.   This is accomplished either by 
one system taking over, or more commonly through the use of gateways, which are 
―technologies and standards‖ that ―allow dissimilar systems to be linked‖ [16, pp. i, 8, 10].  
One of the most notable characteristics of this infrastructure consolidation phase is the 
surfacing of political conflicts, or ―agonistic‖ tensions:  
in their moments of emergence, infrastructures can be a site of intense conflict 
 …. Infrastructures in the making …are … agonistic phenomena:  imagined, produced, 
refined, and occasionally reassessed in a stratified and deeply conflictual field [16, p 24].    
 
Drawing from work by Star & Ruhleder [57] on the importance of social practices relative to 
infrastructure development, Edwards et al. [16] stress that technological consolidation is 
generally easier to manage than are the attendant changes in relations between social and 
organizational units.  This is because developing infrastructure entails redistributing resources 
and opportunities, therefore engaging a ―deep politics of design‖ in which ―people and groups 
fight over, around, and through the systems and networks that govern their lives‖ [17, p. 372].4  
Our cases were replete with data for two of these types of tensions, which are described next, and 
are summarized in Table 2. 
Tensions around Interest and Exclusion  
Every infrastructure development effort has perceived winners and losers as the 
distribution of opportunities and influence change [16, p. 24].  These tensions were so common 
that one Delta engineer off-handedly referred to ―food fights‖ over requirements.  Such tensions 
also commonly surfaced in struggles around practicalities of designing technology gateways to 
bridge across different systems and networks, as experienced by the Gamma engineers: 
                                                 
4
  Re-distribution effects of government information and communication infrastructure projects appear to be stronger 
and more immediate than those of physical infrastructure projects such as roads and bridges, public utilities and 
airports (cf. special issue of California Management Review on ―Infrastructure Meets Business,‖ Winter 2009, 
51(2)). 
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―Originally we were struggling with – ‗Can we develop in time and within budget?‘  Now we‘re 
trying to fill all the needs and that answer will be ‗No.‘‖   
Tensions around Ownership / Investment  
Similarly, the engineers were well-aware that funding mechanisms, policy options, and 
other external constraints were significant sources of tension for their engineering projects.  A 
Gamma engineer stated: ―When outsiders dictate which [gateway technology], you lose control 
and there‘s higher risk.‖  Tensions with external stakeholders also commonly surfaced around 
funding and budgetary arrangements:  ―Congressional districts are among the stakeholders—
How do you deal with the congressional politics?‖ (Epsilon) ―The … industry controls a large 
portion of … jobs in congressional districts.‖  (Gamma)   
Agonistic Tensions and Project Success / Failure 
In looking across the five cases we found that the projects that the engineers generally 
considered more successful exhibited less disruption from interest/exclusion tensions.  The 
Alpha and Delta projects were identified as relatively successful –– they were also the only two 
cases out of the five in which member organizations had joined the government enterprise 
voluntarily.  For example, an Alpha interviewee indicated:  ―Some people didn‘t want to be an 
Alpha node because they had other things to use their money for... Others were jumping on the 
bandwagon... ‗We‘re Alpha all the way.‘‖  Alpha and Delta projects were developed within well-
established government enterprises which were relatively stable and had agreed-upon 
governance mechanisms in place to enforce member compliance.  In contrast, each of the other 
three projects labored under a government mandate to link together systems and technologies as 
a means to consolidate a new government enterprise to be comprised of organizational units that 
traditionally competed with each other for funding and political recognition.  In these cases 
project management seemed to try to satisfy everyone, ending up over-committed and under-
15 March 2010 
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resourced, with the result that the projects experienced more volatile and disruptive 
interest/exclusion tensions and the mandate became recognized as infeasible.  One interviewee 
reported that the Gamma effort ―affected just about every program in the [service branch] – 
caused a lot of churn for systems that should never have had it … one of the most laughed at 
mandates....  It wasn‘t clear that you could do all that with software or get the crypto to work – 
we laughed and we cried.‖  Additional data supporting these findings are summarized in Table 2. 
<< insert Table 2 about here >> 
Some interviewees hypothesized that the mandates for such ambitious consolidation efforts were 
learning ―experiments‖ intended to find where the limits were.  Yet the fact that these failures 
were so enormously costly casts doubt upon such wisdom, and foreshadows our next result. 
Tensions around Pacing   
We were particularly struck by a consistent set of tensions around differences in 
stakeholders‘ orientations to the pace at which the evolutionary process of infrastructure 
development itself should proceed (see examples in Table 3).  Clashes between organizations 
responsible for exploiting fast-paced streams of innovation and those concerned with slower-
paced testing and operational fielding processes occurred in all of our cases (cf. [1]).  The former 
were long-range planning or R&D organizations (often bearing names that included ―lab‖ or 
―experimentation‖ in their title).  The latter were government organizations either directly 
engaged in current operations or responsible for the ―acquisition‖ of technologies to meet the 
needs of users already working in the field (users dependent upon situated combinations of 
legacy and innovative technologies).   
            There is an inherent structural tension between these types of organizations.  The 
expectations for improvisation and discontinuous change that are common within cultures of 
innovation contrast with the institutional arrangements for ―acquisition,‖ i.e., the contractual, 
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legal, and regulatory arrangements for how new technological systems are to be funded, built, 
and fielded, which are rigorous and proceed cautiously in order to minimize risks (cf. [40]).  In 
our cases, senior officials concerned with ―transformation‖ of military forces or ―next 
generation‖ civil technologies advocated discontinuous change, whereas senior officials 
primarily concerned with ongoing operations and end-users already out in the field displayed 
little tolerance for any change that was more than incremental.  One Beta engineer described 
these inter-organizational tensions explicitly:  
there was conflict between the acquisition side, [which was] relying on historical 
understanding of what it takes to field a product in a safe and suitable way, and a [rapid 
prototyping / agile] group who was trying to foster a leaner and new approach.  Distrust, 
mistrust, second-guessing, not best of relationship. … ‗Us‘ vs. ‗Them.‘   
 
Similarly, a Gamma manager offered an eloquent description via email:  ―There are loosely two 
camps.  One camp … tend to emphasi[ze] leap-ahead capability.  Their focus is on the 
[technology] to be fielded [ten years out].  The other camp… tend to emphasize more rapid 
fielding across the broader force (e.g., lower-cost, good-enough capabilities).‖  
These pacing tensions were exacerbated by rapid leadership turnover.  Large 
infrastructure technology projects which take many years to complete were usually initiated by 
individuals who occupied their positions for only two to three years before moving on to other 
jobs due to political appointments or military rotations.  Thus, there was rarely a single 
individual in charge of the entire project for long enough to effectively mediate differences 
among the stakeholders or dictate final decisions.  One Gamma engineer described such a 
situation:  ―The program was already going, processes already in place.  Then the new [program 
executive officer] was trying to put his new [plan] in place.  Trying new architecture, 
requirements, specs.  People were already building things. …Other things start clean.  So, we’re 
a little broken in my mind.”  In response, mid- and lower-level personnel in both the civil service 
and military commands, who were long-term (if not lifetime) employees, were tempted to simply 
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wait for the leader-initiated change efforts to ―blow over‖ as the leaders left, a tactic referred to 
as ―slow rolling.‖  One Alpha interviewee made the point explicitly:  ―The culture is changing, 
but only because I think [the top two leaders] have stayed there long enough ….  if people don‘t 
see the value, they will slow roll you.‖  Pacing tensions manifested in many different ways as 
summarized in Table 3, although ―requirements creep‖ and ―requirements churn‖ seemed 
especially ubiquitous throughout the cases.  
<< insert Table 3 about here >> 
Developing Capabilities:  Changing Engineering Management Practices 
Some of our interviewees indicated that they are responding to the challenges of the 
agonistic tensions in their projects by following an evolutionary approach.  Denning, Gunderson 
& Hayes-Roth [13] posit that an evolutionary approach that involves ―continual adaptation to the 
environment‖ through ―successive releases‖ of new technology and/ or survival of the fittest 
technology is necessary to reverse the increasing rate of failure in large system projects.  Our 
findings show that these adaptive engineering management practices can be understood more 
specifically as capabilities of incremental modularization and reintegration across organizational 
boundaries.   Systems engineers are modularizing large systems and networks into smallish 
―chunks‖ and then working to recombine them in different ways at later times.  Data 
summarizing these findings are summarized in Table 4. 
<< insert Table 4 about here. >> 
Modularizing Technologies 
To support separability and recombinability of components, engineers were developing 
capabilities for modularizing technologies.  As an Alpha engineer explained, ―For information 
systems, take on acquisitions that you can do within a year – completed within lifecycle – 
longevity of requirement.  You basically evolve systems, pick off bite-size increments. Try 
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things and take risks, and if it doesn‘t work, throw it out and start again.‖  As the engineer noted, 
smaller chunks have shorter project timelines, which helps to avoid requirements creep and 
adjust to changing constraints and policies.  Therefore, systems engineers are more willing to 
cancel or change projects and shorten completion times.  For example, Delta projects were 
operating on ―task order‖ contracts that supported multiple exit points where engineers could 
decide whether to renew the contract, thus allowing them to adapt to changes more readily.   
Data revealed reliance on prototypes and the use of less expensive and readily-available 
COTS products that also helped with shortening the time-frame from requirements through 
development to fielding.  ―Prototyping is key … it is used to better capture user requirements and 
to validate as early as possible man-machine interface, etc.‖ (Delta).  Engineers pushed 
prototypes and/or COTS tools out into the field to circumvent the slow formal acquisition 
process, sometimes simply re-categorizing them to move them into the hands of operational 
users in a timely fashion:  ―Many [user groups]…are pursuing alternative interim solutions … 
they use the term ‗interim‘ to get it approved.‖ (Gamma).  Such smaller chunks of technology 
facilitated the reconciliation of interoperability constraints and eased the approval and 
acceptance process, in addition to the technology transfer phase that precedes consolidation 
during the infrastructure evolution process [16].  
Integrating Across Actors in Conflictual Fields  
Once technologies and programs had been modularized, a different set of challenges, also 
illustrated in Table 4, emerged as the modules were integrated back into new arrangements.   For 
example, the Alpha case involved consolidation of over 100 different types of databases into a 
small handful of large database systems.  Such technical challenges were perennially 
compounded by agonistic tensions and disagreements over how re-combinations should be 
accomplished.   
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Our data indicated that engineers developed a range of capabilities to meet these 
challenges.  One basic integration practice involved redrawing boundaries around collections of 
legacy and engineering programs to forge new program identities.  For example, after having 
already been in existence for 4-5 years, the Delta project was being renamed to reflect a change 
of scope from an exclusive focus on military capabilities to one accommodating interoperability 
with other governmental elements: ―Part of the strategy is naming.  People get used to a name 
and what it means and its scope and how to communicate in their … environment.‖  A new name 
would support new conceptualizations and practices around a broader scope. 
More generally, engineering management practices for integration rely on agreements 
represented in schedules and documents and other boundary objects [8], [56].  A sample of these 
are included in Table 4 (in bold).  Higher-level (i.e., ―organizational‖) interdependencies were 
commonly coordinated through the use of documents.  For example, a Concept of Operations 
(―CONOPS‖) document spells out the processes in which a required technology is expected to be 
used, and a Performance Requirements Document (―PRD‖) is a written specification of what the 
technology should be able to do once it is built / delivered.  At the lower levels, where many 
more technical details must be tracked (such as managing changing requirements and risks), 
interdependencies were usually coordinated with software tools such as spreadsheets or 
databases; the Dynamic Object-Oriented Requirements System (DOORS) was one such tool.    
To yield effective integration, changes in boundaries, names, and documentary objects 
must be linked with complementary adjustments in stakeholder practices.  Our data indicate that 
the most common approach to harmonizing stakeholder practices involved instituting a recurring 
series of meetings attended by a consistent set of representatives from groups affected by the 
relevant technological interdependencies.  These meetings occurred at multiple levels throughout 
the enterprise; depending upon the program and level of representative members, they were 
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termed ―boards,‖ ―integrated project teams‖ (IPTs), ―working groups,‖ and so forth as 
highlighted in the Integration Capabilities column of Table 4.  Representatives normally included 
some subset of the stakeholder and subject-matter expert groups specified in the Prince 2 
methodology (i.e., line management, project management, resource manager, operational 
customer, support organization, and transformation organization) [46].
  
 
Within these recurring meetings, agonistic tensions of inclusion/exclusion, 
ownership/investment, and temporal pacing would emerge and would normally be addressed 
pragmatically [9] by collective decisions about how to manage interdependencies. Participating 
representatives would then carry the decisions back to their separate organizational units, which 
would then modify their practices accordingly.  The agreements and decisions represented in 
boundary objects could thus be likened to ―knots in the web of infrastructure technologies and 
concurrent socio-institutional provisions‖ [16, p. 36], tying together the different participants‘ 
orientations and technological trajectories.      
Our data also revealed several enterprise-level capabilities for integrating changes in 
technologies and practices.  In the Delta enterprise, engineers relied upon a ―Capability Package‖ 
mechanism.  This approach united financial, technical, and organizational dimensions of the 
enterprise in a single formal process for initiating funding and facilitating budget planning and 
the design of technical requirements and architecture.   It was initiated at the highest level of 
enterprise management and progressed through consensual agreements to deeper levels of detail. 
Although a ―slow and cumbersome‖ process, it generally resulted in consensual agreements 
about how to move forward with engineering decisions.   
Another enterprise-level means for integrating a multitude of components and 
stakeholders was the ―spiral development‖ model used in Beta, which emphasized iterative 
cycles of integration and operational testing as major linkages between technology development 
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and fielding.  This involved provisionally accepting large numbers of new candidate 
technologies (termed ―initiatives‖), testing them against a baseline system in orchestrated field 
―experiments‖ that involved up to hundreds of participants, and then moving forward with those 
technologies deemed successful.  It was usually carried out incrementally and iteratively [45] as 
a process extending over multiple years with new technologies diffusing out into field use via 
managed increments and in accordance with CONOPS developed through the exercises.   
Finally, if all other integration efforts failed, a last-resort strategy more in keeping with 
both military and traditional systems engineering approaches was to consolidate budgetary and 
managerial control within a single ―executive office‖ responsible for the systems engineering 
effort.  Such efforts to rein in divergent stakeholders were attempted in various forms across all 
five cases; however, tensions continued to emerge between the formal hierarchies, operational 
users in the field, and newer innovative improvisations leading to eventual fragmentation [30].   
Role of Systems Engineering Professionals and Skills for Influence 
In explaining how they developed and utilized modularization and integration 
capabilities, interviewees offered many observations and insights about aspects of their role that 
were challenging, surprising, and often different from their training and preparation.  We 
identified two major themes from the interviews – ambidextrous roles and influence skills – as 
illustrated by the quotations in Table 5. 
<< insert Table 5 about here >> 
Systems Engineers Play Ambidextrous Roles  
As mentioned above, the systems engineers we interviewed were employees of an 
FFRDC in the US or a comparable international organization; each such organization is 
responsible for a large umbrella contract with one or more specific government agencies.  The 
systems engineers work on separate, individual programs within that government agency or 
15 March 2010 
18 
agencies.  Whereas the immediate customer (government agency program office) is responsible 
for performance of a specific technology program, the umbrella contract emphasizes both the 
work for the immediate customer and higher-level concerns regarding enterprise capabilities, 
including interoperability.  Therefore, the systems engineers are ultimately accountable both to 
managers within the program office and indirectly – through the management chain within their 
FFRDC (or equivalent international) organization – to higher-level executives at the project‘s 
sponsoring government agency.   
As a result, the systems engineers juggle competing evaluative criteria stemming from 
their often physical location within the customer organization (cf. [35], [54]), and their career 
progression within the contractor organization and their collaborative projects.
5
  As illustrated in 
Table 5, some senior systems engineers talk about being ―dual-hatted‖ which means they have 
one job title for their employer and another for their customer.  ―I am dual-hatted, I run the 
[FFRDC] project that supports the [government program executive office] and I also, from the 
government perspective, run the systems engineering organization for [that same government 
program executive office].‖  Others simply juggle responsibilities anyway. 
This balancing of accountability to different stakeholders is especially important in 
enterprise systems engineering because, as noted previously, competing stakeholders and 
individual programs often have few incentives to cooperate with each other.  The systems 
engineering organization thus affords a potential ―back-channel‖ for enterprise communication 
and management concerning technical decision-making during infrastructure development.  
Systems engineers working for an FFRDC therefore have a significant resource in their access to 
information and people, and to each other:  ―These [FFRDC systems engineers] at commands 
have a back channel, so they started hooking [government agency] people up especially as doing 
                                                 
5
  Star & Ruhleder [57] emphasize the importance of local/global difference in infrastructure, although their 
emphasis is more on end users than developers.  
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technical design work… in trying to get command issues teed up ahead of time.‖ (Alpha)  Or as 
a senior Epsilon engineer noted, ―Different [stakeholder] groups … don‘t align… They don‘t 
align yet, let me put it that way.  If we‘re successful, they‘ll have to align.‖  
Systems Engineers Cultivate Influence Rather Than Power 
Although a few senior systems engineers are formally dual-hatted and occupy positions 
of legitimate authority within the client organization,
6
 most systems engineers assume individual 
contributor roles (presence on teams, liaison roles, etc.) within the client organization.  Their 
influence therefore depends on their reputation and relationships rather than any formal 
authority.  An interviewee referred to the systems engineering unit of the Epsilon program as an 
―office of influence.  No budget, do not implement… no authority, but a lot of influence.‖ 
Sources of influence range from the more technical to the more interpersonal.  On the 
more technical side, the systems engineers have generally been perceived by customers as 
objective, problem-focused, and technically-capable, and therefore trustworthy.  As an Epsilon 
interviewee said, ―we do good analysis, we have good reputations so they come to us.‖  
Engineers have also generated influence through providing demos and ―technical guidance.‖ 
But, increasingly, technical expertise is insufficient as a source of influence.  ―When I 
[first started], we did technical problem solving; now it‘s cultural problem solving.‖ (Epsilon) 
―Success of projects is about people.  If you don‘t know [the right] people, you can work for a 
long time and not succeed.‖ (Delta)  As a result, systems engineers find themselves exercising 
influence and even leadership from a strategic position at the nexus of information and 
relationships, but without any explicit training or skill base.  ―I was put here [by my General 
Manager] for a reason and nobody is giving me a recipe. You have to do this by instinct, figure 
                                                 
6
  These senior project leaders were overrepresented in our interviews. 
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out a path to get what you want.‖ (Epsilon)  ―We try to be flexible… Listen, offer suggestions… 
Compromise, negotiation, alternatives…  How do we go from nothing to a system of systems?  
Compromise is a big part of it.‖ (Beta)   
These observations about the ―people skills‖ needed in senior systems engineering roles 
should not be entirely surprising.  Decades ago, Hall [29] identified five traits of the ideal 
systems engineer, two of which were ―facility in human relations‖ and ―a gift for expression‖ 
(the others were technical).  More recently, NASA identified five themes among characteristics 
and behaviors frequently observed in highly regarded systems engineers [61]:  Leadership, 
Attitudes & Attributes, Communication, Problem Solving & Systems Thinking, and Technical 
Acumen.  Under Leadership, for example, there are ten competencies such as ―Possesses 
Influencing Skills‖ and under each competency there are descriptions of observable behaviors, 
including ―Understands the political forces that affect the project,‖ ―Influences actions of 
personnel not under their direct management,‖ and ―Builds a base of contacts, information 
sources, knowledge, and expertise.‖  Overlapping behaviors and competencies reappear in other 
themes, such as ―Gains respect, credibility, and trust‖ (in Attitudes & Attributes) and ―Facilitates 
an environment of open and honest communication‖ (in Communication).   
Thus the engineers have been developing a constellation of capabilities and skills to meet 
the challenges associated with the endless stream of changes in their development environment. 
DISCUSSION  
The intent of our research project was to capture the emerging knowledge among systems 
engineers about their enterprise level challenges.  Our results contribute in several areas:  1) the 
management of infrastructure technology projects, 2) the organizational design and engineering 
of government enterprises, and 3) the changing role of systems engineering.  
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Management of Infrastructure Technology Projects 
Although organizational conflicts around the development of information systems have 
been well-noted in the literatures for information systems (e.g., [38], [39], [43]), systems 
engineering (e.g., [22], [32]), and management (e.g., [21], [44]), we found special value in work 
by Edwards et al. [16] for developing understanding of enterprise-scale systems engineering.  
Their explanation of the consolidation of traditional systems into infrastructures and the 
attendant agonistic tensions shed light on the challenges that the engineers had described.  More 
recently, Edwards et al. [17] continue to develop an agenda for understanding and addressing the 
agonistic tensions in infrastructure development.  
Our findings about engineering capabilities and skills extend Edwards and colleagues‘ 
ideas and their case studies toward even larger and more complex infrastructure efforts.  Looking 
at the evolving infrastructures of these large government enterprises, we find that capabilities of 
modularization and integration, coupled with skills for influence, are critical for engineering 
within these agonistic environments.  These findings add specificity to the general notions of 
loosely managed cooperation among developers and use of an evolutionary approach in IT 
development [13].  And in contrast to previous research concentrating on specific types of 
modularity (e.g., [53]), our work highlights a broad range of modularization practices, such as 
using prototypes and shorter contracts, as capabilities that systems engineers are developing for 
achieving modularization.  Similarly with regard to integration, our finding that engineers are 
developing new skills and capabilities for managing interdependencies across organizational 
units and practices adds to and complements existing work on management techniques for 
achieving technological interoperability.  Additionally, our identification of pacing tensions adds 
another dimension to Edwards et al.‘s [16] categorization of agonistic tensions in infrastructure.  
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Organizational Design and Engineering of Government Enterprises  
While there is a large body of literature that recognizes complementarities between 
organizational design and the design of information systems and technologies (e.g., [3], [5], [23], 
[39]), our results advise caution in assuming that these ideas are directly transferrable to 
government enterprises and infrastructures.  Whereas organizational design may be managed 
through strategic (top-down) design and supported with enterprise resource planning systems, 
government efforts to mandate enterprise consolidation are at much greater risk of degenerating 
into destructive fields of agonistic conflict if they suffer from leadership turnover and lack of 
agreement over assessment criteria [14], and when effective governance is not already in place.     
Our research directs attention in particular to the pacing tensions that arise during 
infrastructure consolidation – a form of conflict alarming to observe in an institutional field of 
public government enterprises.  We found that as each stakeholder organization struggled to 
entrain to multiple pacers within its enterprise environment, major oppositional tensions emerged 
between reliance on structure embedded in traditional hierarchical cultures, and celebration of 
creative destruction in innovation cultures.  This enterprise-scale result was sometimes more like 
a war over which organization would submit to the other‘s pace rather than a benign ―dance of 
entrainment‖ [2] or inevitably ―linked elements of a larger formulation‖ [49].  The failures of 
Beta and Gamma in particular were extremely costly – temporally, financially and reputationally, 
not to mention morale-wise – when government mandates attempted to force competing 
organizations into a consolidated enterprise using emerging technologies as the ―tip of the 
spear.‖7  We suspect that such tensions may be stretching the limits of systems engineering 
capabilities to the breaking point, especially in light of the path dependence that ―locks in‖ 
effects of choices and that can lead to dominance of inferior technologies over potentially 
                                                 
7
  Especially as was previously done through techniques of business process re-engineering (BPR). 
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superior solutions [16, p. 17], [59]).  Therefore, initiators and higher-level managers of 
government infrastructure efforts must become attuned to potential mismatches in temporal 
cycles across the intended enterprise.   
A more optimistic finding is that systems engineers‘ newly-developing capabilities can 
facilitate the continual process of organizing and re-organizing organizational units and practices 
within these turbulent environments of agonistic tensions and technological innovation.  These 
engineering capabilities provide an engineering-oriented complement to the growing body of 
organizationally-oriented theories of task articulation and rearrangement of work practices, 
routines and processes for accommodating new technologies (e.g., [6], [24], [25], [26], [55]); 
together they point to new ways to resolve local–global tensions in infrastructure development 
[57].   
The Changing Role of Systems Engineers 
Systems engineers have traditionally had a professional responsibility and a unique role 
in terms of "systems thinking," i.e., being big picture ―visionary‖ designers [16] who manage 
technical constraints within relatively stable environments.  But in unstable multi-stakeholder 
infrastructure projects they must find a delicate balance between what will work technically and 
what will work politically, along with what will satisfy the basic intent of the engineering task.   
Because systems engineers are not often tied to one specific funder, but are assumed to be 
available to whichever funders come out on top, they have some clout in helping (or hindering) 
competition between funders.  Systems engineers thus find themselves in a key leverage position 
for determining each next step in emergent organizing processes:  they are technically savvy and 
familiar with many stakeholders while their training predisposes them to avoid taking political 
sides.  Combining technical knowledge and familiarity with the role of honest broker across 
multiple stakeholders thus renders systems engineers in a position to be a ―back channel‖ for 
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integrating across stakeholders in ways somewhat analogous to labor negotiators and 
international diplomats.   
The necessary skills for exercising influence and getting things done through other 
people, particularly in a multi-stakeholder environment, have rarely been taught but are now 
entering the systems engineering curriculum.  These skills include listening, delivering 
persuasive arguments, role-taking, relationship building through competence and integrity, and 
negotiating (including compromising and finding win-win solutions) [4], [12], [47], [58], [61]. 
Commenting on the need to combine academic education with real world experience, Ring and 
Madni [50, p. 975] suggest that ―no academic institution can provide a sufficient learning 
environment for developing SE practitioners.‖ 
In the meantime, systems engineers working on government infrastructure projects are 
already developing a somewhat different skill set than the linear technical analysis of traditional 
systems engineering.  Prototypical behaviors that were invented by senior systems engineers in 
our cases included the recurring meetings of representatives from affected organizations, and the 
―backchannel‖ networking among MITRE engineers that span organizational boundaries among 
stakeholders.  These afford manifold practical implications for a more ―holistic engineering 
education‖ [28], as well as for review and evaluation of their accomplishments.  Beyond the 
individual competencies of systems engineers, there are implications for the overall management 
of systems engineering programs and thoughtful strategy about how systems engineering 
organizations can use their connections to build trustful networks ahead of the need for specific 
technological change.   
Limitations and Future Research 
Our research is based on five case studies within a highly constrained set of government 
sectors, and most of the projects are still ongoing.  Further, each case study is based on a small 
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number of interviews, in most cases with only MITRE personnel rather than a broad sampling of 
stakeholders.  However, our results are consistent with a growing literature on the limitations of 
traditional systems engineering and the need for advanced systems engineering capabilities.    
Research is needed to accumulate a broader set of examples of large, multi-stakeholder 
government infrastructure projects, including longitudinal studies of practices and their degree of 
success.  We would especially like to see more research on spiral development (cf. [7]) which 
seems to offer promise for managing infrastructure development tensions.  Research contrasting 
non-government cases would also be very interesting.   
CONCLUSION  
In this paper we have leveraged practitioner perspectives to identify challenges facing 
systems engineers working on government infrastructure technology projects and the capabilities 
and skills they are developing in response to those challenges.  We found that agonistic tensions 
surface during the infrastructure consolidation phase, especially when stakeholder relations are 
not already well-established and, at least in our government cases, particularly with regard to the 
pacing of enterprise change and infrastructure development.  There is some preliminary evidence 
that the success of these projects is related to the way agonistic tensions are managed.  In their 
adaptive response to the difficult experience of these tensions, systems engineers are developing 
capabilities of modularization and integration to facilitate more rapid and flexible organizing and 
new relational skills, especially with regard to influence and functioning as a trusted and well-
connected neutral third party.  Whether these adaptations will be adequate to meet the challenges 
remains unclear at this time.  
We see several possible paths forward, all of which support the observation that ―reliable 
systems for surfacing and dealing with [infrastructure] tensions need to be put in place‖ [33].  
First, while systems engineers are not at the executive level, there may be advantages to raising 
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their positional authority, at least of a chief engineer or project manager, and highlighting the 
importance of the role of ―honest broker‖ to moderate agonistic tensions.  Second, these 
challenges are not the sole responsibility of systems engineers; there should be changes in 
complementary roles, e.g., managers of systems engineers, project managers, stakeholder 
leaders.  Finally, infrastructure development and sustainability, especially in contexts of rapid 
leadership turnover and lack of consensual evaluative criteria, requires special attention to the 
tensions between innovation and integration.  Hobday, Davies, and Prencipe [31] note that 
systems integration is an organizing crux for networks of large-scale economic organization.  
Like canaries in a coal mine, the experience of enterprise systems engineers may be forewarning 
of an uninhabitable environment.  What would be our best intelligent response? 
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Table 1 – Cases 
 
Case US/ 
Int'l 
Military/ 
Civilian 
Project 
Length 
Interviews 
(n=30) 
Alpha - The Alpha information system was created to support the communications and information needs 
of other government departments and their major components.  Using a distributed, or decentralized, 
approach, major components were responsible for producing and maintaining data on a particular area of 
responsibility.  Each component had control over its own budget and had the flexibility to pick its own 
hardware, software, and data structures, creating the tendency to focus on local needs and requests.  Then a 
reconfiguration of the larger organization occurred, focusing on developing a globally-consistent, 
standardized IT enterprise with a centralized primary budget and planning authority.   
US Military  > 20 years Tier 1: 3; 
Tier 2: 1 
Beta - Two separate, competing programs aimed at modernizing the software components for a major 
operations planning system were being merged into a single project, Beta.  One was a decade-long program 
that focused on incremental improvements to, and upgrading of, the existing legacy system through a 
highly structured engineering acquisition process.  The second used a more revolutionary, or ―remove and 
replace,‖ approach based on an agile prototyping methodology to quickly develop new components.   
US Military < 10 years Tier 1: 4; 
Tier 2: 4 
Gamma- The Gamma project was established to address challenges in operational communications and 
coordination.  The goal was to develop software and hardware systems to support high capacity, highly 
networked, secure wireless communications that would be interoperable, affordable, and scalable.  An 
integrated design and acquisition program was developed to span five Departments, each with different 
operational constraints.  After more than five years, the program underwent a major reorganization and 
initial operational requirements were approved. 
US Military < 10 years Tier 1: 4; 
Tier 2: 0 
Delta - The Delta information system was chartered to provide an integrated set of services supporting 
consultation, command, and control across global operations of an international alliance.  Initially created 
to integrate information systems of two different Departments, Delta was tasked with the technical 
integration of a large number of legacy systems with pre-existing sub-projects, phases of projects, and 
fielded prototypes into a system that would be both coherent and flexible.  
Int‘l Military + 
National 
gov‘ts 
< 10 years Tier 1: 6; 
Tier 2: 0 
Epsilon - An aging infrastructure and a projected two-to-threefold increase in system demand led to the 
creation of the Epsilon program to coordinate the efforts of six federal agencies to address these system 
needs.  One federal agency was assigned to oversee the creation of the system plan; industry and academia 
later joined the effort.  Safety, efficiency, quality, affordability, scalability, variability in equipment and 
participation, security threats, and an increasing concern for the environment also contributed to the 
complexity of the requirements for the evolving system. 
US Civilian < 5  years Tier 1: 5; 
Tier 2: 5 
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Table 2 – Infrastructure Consolidation by Case:  
Enterprise Membership, Agonistic Tensions and Success  
 
Case   Alpha Beta Gamma Delta Epsilon 
Membership 
in Enterprise  
 Voluntary Mandated  Mandated Voluntary Mandated 
Interest/ 
Exclusion 
Tensions 
―…started … pulling 
[things and people] 
together under one 
umbrella.  Building an 
empire, did it pretty 
correctly..... They get an 
empire, but it‘s also 
good for everyone else. 
.... Good for everyone to 
get and share data.‖ 
―The scope of this endeavor 
is far beyond what – had the 
Enterprise community 
understood the scope of the 
endeavor, we never would 
have embarked on it with the 
framework we did.  We had a 
schedule and cost estimates 
that are ‗silly,‘ unrealistic, 
when one understands the 
scope of the activity.‖ 
―The original requirements 
were very ambitious from [the 
agency] – do everything for 
everyone and in a short time 
frame.  Had such good top-
cover that no one could say 
‗the Emperor had no clothes.‘‖   
 ―We have some 
advantages over US or 
other nations - only one 
pot of money  … On the 
other hand, nations insist 
no sole-source 
procurement; need to 
support multiple types of 
equipment.‖ 
 ―Different groups 
have very different 
motivations, everyone 
has their own 
objectives … they 
don‘t align.‖  
Ownership/ 
Investment 
Tensions 
―The golden rule: 
‗whoever has the gold, 
rules.‘ …so that‘s why 
we changed - he got the 
money… started looking 
at how to build 
Enterprise.  ‖ 
―[Service research arm] 
wants to do all the 
development and take it all 
away from [the acquisition 
agency, which] thinks doing 
fielding only is dysfunctional 
and wants to do development 
too.‖ 
―Gamma technology does not 
run on its own.  It runs as part 
of someone else‘s network…. 
Same hardware and software 
being used eight different 
ways, just by [Service branch], 
depending on their platform.   
―Applications have to be 
developed by industry in a 
netware environment; 
they can‘t be developed in 
isolation.  ….  [and at the 
same time,] strategic 
partnerships (e.g. 
Microsoft) are not under 
our control.‖   
―It‘s all about saving 
money, but they don‘t 
say ‗it‘s saving 
industry money‘.‖ 
 Engineers’ 
Evaluation  
of Success 
Relatively successful, 
especially historically 
Failed Consolidation Serious problems warranted 
top down re-org to establish 
control   
Relatively successful so 
far, but still early 
Struggled initially, 
some signs of 
progress, still early in 
development life-cycle 
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Table 3 – Pacing Tensions 
 
Case  
Alpha  ―The culture is changing, but only because I think [leader X] and [deputy leader Y] have stayed there long enough ….  if people don‘t see 
the value, they will slow roll you‖ 
Beta ―We knew it was unreasonable under the timeline that was planned – that was plainly obvious to folks.‖   
  ―The acquisition system doesn‘t support IT acquisition well, the testing process alone is too long‖ 
Gamma  ―Q: How does your program deal with changing requirements and constraints?‖  ―A: Daily. [grin]‖    
 ―A version is out of date before it hits the street. … evolution is moving beyond requirements too quickly to keep up.  You‘re always 
chasing what the [technology] should look like.‖   
 ―It‘s Mr. [X] and it‘s a shame he left the government.  I put a significant piece of the blame on him, I don‘t know where he went -- if you 
have short timers in those slots and they want to make their mark -- he pushed a lot of policy one worse than the other.‖ 
Delta  ―The only thing that is constant in our world is changing requirements‖  
 ―Have been at [Agency] for about 15 years, and it has taken 15 years to develop the background to be able to do this job.  …security, 
legacy, people, process management, project management; so many issues you have to take into account.‖ 
Epsilon  ―Too much too fast.‖ 
  ―Our government institutions‘ set up is not conducive for fast decisions … sharing, collaborating, budgeting, etc. [are] very, very hard … 
Each organization has their own budget process, their own speed bumps, etc… congress is very critical.‖ 
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Table 4 – Capabilities for Modularization and Integration  
Case Modularization Capabilities Integration Capabilities 
Alpha ―One of the most fundamental modularization practices is 
breaking existing large systems and networks into smaller 
chunks of technologies…‖ 
―I think there were quite a few government representatives that – once they bought in, 
that they were going to have a round table and they were going to use it – everybody 
went along….‖ 
Beta ―Strategy is to experiment with technology capability and 
process to further command and control process and 
systems.   Procedure I work is 2 year cycle for new 
initiatives.  Scale down and sort through them - down select 
- to find number that meets set of criteria of agenda set by 
[government agency Chief of Staff].‖   
―Integrated schedules which list all activities needed for each set of tasks which we 
adhere to.  Configuration management board where we don‘t release anything without 
approval.  Manage the process. We rely on an initiative or other providers to build 
products - we do integration.  We really work in integration - worry about touch points, 
sharing drawings, threads to show what will happen.  We need to share information.  
Architecture system diagrams to show this -- diagrams to monitor and configure 
activities.‖ 
Gamma ―I believe COTS could meet 80% of the Increment 1 
requirements already and [we could] have it out there in 
two years.‖ 
―We have a great Risk Process. We have monthly meetings with the technical teams‘ 
leads.  Each team has a risk representative that meets with risk representative group. 
They input the risks in a database and if it is a big enough risk it goes to the RRB (Risk 
Representative Board). They then decide what to do.   They use a Risk Navigation 
Tool to track the risks.‖ 
Delta ―They are following an evolutionary approach in which 
they‘re breaking the larger set into sub-projects and phases 
of projects, shortening the time to avoid requirements 
creep…‖ 
―At the project level, there are one or more Integrated Project Teams (IPTs).  IPTs are 
a coordinating vehicle with the end user committee.  They hold formal meetings, 
develop documents for decision points, are responsible for quality assurance and project 
assurance process. ‖ 
Epsilon N/A (already modularized at outset – separate systems in 
separate agencies) 
―The CONOPS is …. probably the most important practice we have…. The CONOPS 
puts a stake in the ground... The CONOPS served the purpose of articulating a vision … 
and served as a vehicle of departure (‗I subscribe to this,‘ or ‗I don‘t‘). … put down, in 
one place, all those innovative ideas about the future … system.‖ 
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Table 5 – Ambidextrous Roles and Influence Skills for Enterprise Systems Engineering 
 
 
Case Ambidextrous Roles Influence Skills 
Alpha ―[FFRDC] is on both sides of the house – [agency A] and 
[Agency B]‖ 
 
“How do we influence this …‖ 
Beta ―There are 18-20 [service branch] men and women.  [Our 
FFRDC] program is currently allocated 12 staff equivalents or 
years of engineering support.  …. Plus 15 other government 
contractors who look to me as lead engineer.‖    
―We were able to influence them .... Many of the things that were 
put together to guide his decision were put together by us‖ 
Gamma ―Twice a month we meet with all the staff on the program to 
discuss issues of common interest. Benefit there is a shared 
awareness of the program across all of [FFRDC]. People all of a 
sudden realize that people on one side of the company are 
working on the same problem …share, meet and provide better 
support for customer.‖  
―We‘re a little broken in my mind.  Some you can still influence.‖ 
―Encouraging collaboration, sharing data and working with others 
whenever possible.‖ 
Delta ―One of the crucial aspects is the cooperation approach.  Even 
though we have the authority, the cooperation.  It‘s really an 
enterprise-wide approach and not one focused on a personal 
agenda type of program.‖ 
 ―We do not compete with industry …Want to be preferred first 
choice.  Unbiased.  Not trying to sell a nation‘s first choice or a 
nation‘s solution.‖ 
 
 ―Make sure [customers] understand, feel ‗in control‘ or at least part 
of the decision-making process, and therefore that their budget is 
well-spent.  …. publish metrics.  That we are on target and 
producing expected quality…  Eventually (once they trust us) they 
tend to withdraw and focus on other projects.   I like to keep them 
involved, for changes later.‖ 
Epsilon ―On one hand we want to make sure the products are built well 
– but we don‘t have responsibility to build products.  We 
sometimes have to rescue other contractors.‖ 
 
―We tried to look ahead and find opportunities and [customers‘] 
needs and things that were not necessarily on their horizon yet. 
Trying to forward position ourselves to be ready to talk about those 
needs early. If we had that, we can influence them and lead their 
decision-making process.  Trying to position ourselves strategically 
in different positions in content, in different domains, engaging 
different leadership, having broad coverage to influence decision-
making from our different roles.‖ 
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APPENDIX A:   Interview Protocol 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview.  It is part of a joint MITRE-MIT 
research study that leverages social science to help define the discipline and advance the practice 
of ―enterprise systems engineering.‖ [hand them copy of one page description of research 
project]   Enterprise systems engineering encompasses and enriches traditional systems 
engineering as it is practiced within a broader enterprise environment.  <Program name> has 
been identified as good cases for this study.  Your participation in this interview is voluntary.  
You may skip over any questions for any reason and you may stop at any time.  Would you be 
willing to sign this consent form indicating you agree to participate in the interview?  [hand them 
consent form] 
 
A. Would you please tell me the name of the organization you now work for, your current 
position, and give me a brief overview of your role in the work of <program name>? 
 
B. What is your Program Strategy? and what stage(s) are you in currently (planning, 
implementing, fielding, maintenance/evolution)?   What is your development and fielding 
strategy and to what extent are you using prototypes, experiments, and betas?   
 
C. What engineering processes do you use?   
   How do you do requirements? 
     How do you do software design? 
     How do you do software development? 
 
D. What is your program's organizational approach (including government and contractors)? 
 
E. How does your program deal with changing requirements and constraints?  
 
F. How do you work with your stakeholders?  Please discuss your internal stakeholders, 
external stakeholders, and relationships with competitors and other programs.   
 
G. If you had to pass this project off to someone tomorrow, what (one thing) would you want 
them to know? 
 
H. Is there anything else you‘d like to tell me/us about the program or its current context? 
 
 
 
